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EXAMINATION OF THE PROPOSED ILLINOIS 
ANIMAL ABUSE REGISTRY 
Alisha L. Biesinger* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Imagine a scenario: an Illinois mother, Jill, finds a dog on the streets. 
She considers how much her two young children would adore having a pet. 
She knows she could not afford to purchase the dog at a shelter, because she 
can barely afford to feed and clothe her children and pay the bills for the 
apartment.  Although Jill is trying to provide the best that she can for her 
family, she fails to pay the rent and is evicted.  Faced both with the high cost 
of caring for the dog, now named Jack, and her children’s wishes to bring 
him along, Jill has to decide what to do with the dog, pack, and move within 
twenty-four hours.  Despite her growing attachment and the children’s pleas, 
she decides to leave Jack behind.  Her main priorities are her children and 
providing for them, and she knows she cannot afford to keep Jack.  She feels 
the money will be better spent on her children.  The landlord fails to check 
the premises for a few days and, upon inspection of the apartment, a police 
officer finds the animal has been left and neglected.  Jill left an address with 
the landlord, and the police officer locates her and charges her with cruel 
treatment.1  Using his own subjective discretion to determine the dog is 
“starved,” the police officer determines it is best to charge her instead of 
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1. See Human Care for Animal Act, 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.01 (2013). 
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educating her.2  She is convicted of a Class A misdemeanor and is fined 
$1000.3  
If Illinois’ proposed animal abuse registry4 passes, Jill would be 
required to register as an animal abuser.  Finding employment will be hard 
because prospective employers will find her on the public registry, and she 
will still be faced with an impoverished life and two suffering children.  This 
Comment will explain why the proposed animal abuse registry in Illinois 
should not be passed because it pushes constitutional limitations, is 
impractical, and would be ineffective in meeting its goals.  Section II of this 
Comment will provide background information on animal abuse registries, 
including Illinois’ proposed registry, and other relevant Illinois registries. 
Section III will discuss the constitutional limits any registry in Illinois faces. 
Section IV of this Comment will discuss the problems associated with an 
animal abuse registry in Illinois. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Protecting the interests of animals has been a growing concern in recent 
years.5  As such, several national registries have been created6, yet they are 
ineffective.  Several states also have attempted to create statewide animal 
abuse registries, but have failed to pass legislation.7  The alleged 
justifications are minimized when compared to the failures discussed below. 
This is evidence enough of why Illinois’s proposed registry should not be 
passed, and if so, would fail as well.  
                                                                                                                           
2. See ASPCA, ANIMAL CRUELTY: THE LAW IN ILLINOIS 13, 17 (2007) [hereinafter Animal Cruelty, 
ASPCA] (discussing Illinois’ animal abuse laws to provide guidance for those involved in the 
investigatory process).  The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) 
encourages law enforcement to choose between educating or charging a person, while exercising 
their discretion.  Id. at 13–14.  It states, “This comes down to a judgment call based on gut feelings 
as much as anything else.  Remember that you must apply objective criteria, and not base your 
decision on how you personally feel that animals should be treated.”  Id. at 13.  Animal Cruelty 
overlaps with a violation of Owner’s Duties.  Id. at 17.  The ASPCA advises that, “It is up to the 
investigator and prosecutor, and then the judge or jury, to determine when failure to provide 
adequate food or water crosses the line to starvation, and when failure to provide humane care 
becomes cruelly treating an animal.”  Id.  
3. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-55 (2013) (listing maximum sentences for a Class A 
Misdemeanor).  
4. See infra Part II.F and accompanying text. 
5. See Randall Lockwood, Animal Cruelty Prosecution: Opportunities for Early Response to Crime 
and Interpersonal Violence, AM. PROSECUTORS RES. INST. 1, 6 (July 2006), 
http://nationallinkcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Prosecutors-LinkNDAA-APRI.pdf. 
6. See, e.g., DNAPETS, http://www.dnapets.org/about.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2015); Stacy A. 
Nowicki, Comment, On the Lamb: Toward A National Animal Abuser Registry, 17 ANIMAL L.   197, 
229-33 (2010). 
7. See Nowicki, supra note 6. 
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A.  The Alleged Need for an Animal Abuse Registry  
In 1821, Maine was the first state to view animal abuse as a crime.8 
Before this, states did not view harming animals as a crime.  In the following 
thirty years, newly enacted laws reflected the concern not so much for the 
welfare of animals, but for the possibility of these crimes leading to crimes 
against humans.9  Also, states reacted to the public’s interest in protecting 
animals from unnecessary harm by creating penalties for egregious abuse.10 
In recent years, public interest in animal protection has grown.11  Illinois 
enacted the Humane Care for Animals Act on October 1, 1973.12  The Act 
defines duties an owner owes to his or her pet, violations when the duties are 
not met, and penalties associated with such violations.13 
Recent laws have not just addressed the physical welfare of animals, 
but a greater societal need as well.  A link has been recognized between 
animal abuse and other violence.14  Studies have shown that animal cruelty 
can be a “predictor crime.”15  It has been said that “those who have a history 
of repeated acts of intentional violence towards animals are at higher risk for 
exhibiting similar violence or lawlessness towards people in the future.”16 
Further, retrospective studies of incarcerated violent offenders reveal that 
they often have a high frequency of animal abuse offenses in their 
childhood.17  Scholars believe animal cruelty can also be an indicator crime 
where animal abuse likely indicates the offender is abusing someone else.18 
It is also suggested that cruelty to animals destabilizes communities.19  
                                                                                                                           
8. Lockwood, supra note 5, at 6.  
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 9. 
11. Id.  
12. 1973-1974 Ill. Laws 2852 (codified as 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1).  
13. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3-3.04 (2013). 
14. See Animal Cruelty and Human Violence: A Documented Connection, HUMANE SOC’Y (Apr. 25, 
2011), 
http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/abuse_neglect/qa/cruelty_violence_connection_faq.html 
(discussing and citing the relationship between animal abuse and human violence).  
15. Randall Lockwood, Counting Cruelty: Challenges and Opportunities in Assessing Animal Abuse 
and Neglect in America, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ANIMAL ABUSE AND CRUELTY: 
THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLICATION 87, 88 (Frank R. Ascione ed., Purdue U. Press 2008). 
16. Id.; Lockwood, Animal Cruelty Prosecution, supra note 5, at 10.  
17. Lockwood, Counting Cruelty, supra note 15, at 88.  See Christopher Hensely et al., Recurrent 
Childhood Animal Cruelty: Is There a Relationship to Adult Recurrent Interpersonal Violence?, 34 
CRIM. JUST. REV. 248, 254 (2009) (studies showing an association of childhood animal abuse and 
violence against humans as they become adults). 
18. Lockwood, Counting Cruelty, supra note 15, at 88 (explaining how observing animal abusers “can 
often lead to the discovery of people who have been harmed by the same perpetrator, or who are at 
high risk of being harmed . . . . Serious animal neglect can also be an indicator of a variety of social 
problems that need to be addressed.”). 
19. Id. at 87 (stating that, although animal cruelty is seen as a low-level offense that may be overlooked 
by authorities, many people view animals as innocent victims and find animal cruelty very 
disturbing); Lockwood, Animal Cruelty Prosecution, supra note 5, at 12. 
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Lastly, prosecuting animal cruelty is consistent with the balanced approach 
model of juvenile justice.20  The balanced approach model addresses 
“community safety, offender accountability and competency 
development.”21 
The abovementioned reasoning indicates how animal abuse laws may 
prevent violence against humans by preventing animal abuse.  Yet, the only 
animal abuse registry to successfully pass is at the county level in one state, 
and numerous states have failed to pass statewide registries. 
B.  National Registries  
Generally, animal abuse registries intend to compile information about 
animal abusers within a geographic location into a searchable database. 
Currently, no public statewide or national animal abuse registries exist.22  A 
few animal interest organizations have created their own animal abuse 
registries, but they are arguably ineffective because they are informal and 
rely on information provided by the public.23  The Animal Legal Defense 
Fund (“ALDF”) Criminal Justice Program maintains a national database of 
animal cruelty cases and current model animal protection laws; however, it 
is only available to prosecutors, judges, legislators, and researchers.24  At one 
point, one public registry, called “Through Their Eyes (TTE), The National 
Animal Abuse Registry,” was a nonprofit organization based in New 
Hampshire.25  The registry was an entirely volunteer-run organization, and it 
did not receive any government funding.26  The registry was a simple 
spreadsheet where users could browse by an abuser’s last name, and it 
provided the offender’s name, case information, location, and possibly a 
photo.27  The website is no longer maintained, emphasizing the 
ineffectiveness of this type of registry.    
Another website, Pet-Abuse.com, maintains records of animal abuse 
cases from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, 
                                                                                                                           
20. Lockwood, Animal Cruelty Prosecution, supra note 5, at 13 (“In the case of juvenile offenders, 
animal cruelty may be one of the earliest serious offenses to be reported and prosecuted, providing 
the opportunity for intervention at a stage where it is most likely to have positive long-term 
effects.”). 
21. Id.  
22. For an overview of the alternatives to animal abuser registries, see Nowicki, supra note 6 
(discussing the two national registries and the challenges associated). 
23. See DNAPETS, supra note 6; Nowicki, supra note 6. 
24. Criminal Justice Program, ALDF, http://aldf.org/about-us/programs/criminal-justice-program/ 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (discussing the Criminal Justice Program and the services it provides). 
25. See Nowicki, supra note 6, at 229.  
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 229–30. 
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Australia, and Spain.28  The website’s registry is called Animal Abuse 
Registry Database Administration System (AARDAS), and it is publically 
accessible.29  It encompasses a sophisticated advanced search, allowing 
visitors to search by name, zip code, animal type, and case type.30  Although 
appealing, the subjective nature of the database raises serious doubts as to the 
effectiveness of the website.  The website admits it uses its own discretion 
when inputting data, such as classifying cases, and the crime cited may not 
necessarily be the true crime that was charged.31 
C.  Enacted Animal Abuse Registries 
As mentioned above, the only government created animal abuse 
registries exist on a county basis.  The first government entity to pass such a 
registry was Suffolk Country, New York, on October 12, 2010.32  The 
county’s police department contracts with the Suffolk County Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SCSPCA) to establish and maintain a 
registry.33  The law requires Suffolk County residents who have been 
convicted of an animal abuse crime and are eighteen or older to register with 
the Suffolk County Animal Abuse Registry.34  Failure to register will result 
in a $1000 fine or possible jail time.35  Offenders must provide their name, 
aliases, current address, and a photo.36  A person is required to remain on the 
registry “for five years following his or her release from incarceration or the 
date judgment was rendered, whichever is later.”37  However, registered 
persons who are subsequently convicted of animal abuse crimes must remain 
on the registry for ten years following their most recent conviction.38 
Although the Suffolk County SPCA claims the Animal Abuse Registry 
                                                                                                                           
28. Database of Criminal Animal Cruelty Cases, PET-ABUSE.COM, http://www.pet-
abuse.com/pages/cruelty_database.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
29. Animal Cruelty Database Notes, PET-ABUSE.COM, http://www.pet-abuse.com/pages/ 
cruelty_database/database_notes.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
30. Database Cases, PET-ABUSE.COM, supra note 28.  
31. Database Notes, PET-ABUSE.COM, supra note 29.   
32. SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., CODE ch. 299, art. IV (2010).  
33. Id. § 299-27 (stating that the county will contract with qualified organizations, but there’s no 
information on a specific entity.) 
34. Id. § 299-26 (defining animal abuse crime as, “The commission of the following enumerated crimes 
against an animal: animal fighting, as defined in the New York State Agriculture and Markets Law 
("AML") § 351; overdriving, torturing and injuring animals; failure to provide proper sustenance, 
as defined in AML § 353; aggravated cruelty to animals, as defined in AML § 353-a; abandonment 
of animals, as defined in AML § 355; failure to provide proper food and drink to an impounded 
animal, as defined in AML § 356; interference with or injury to certain domestic animals, as defined 
in AML § 361; harming a service animal in the first degree, as defined in New York State Penal 
Code § 242.15.”). 
35. SUFFOLK COUNTY, CODE § 299-31.  
36. Id. § 299-28(A).  
37. Id. § 299-28(B).  
38. Id. § 299-28(D). 
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Website is currently available, one wonders why more than three years later 
no offenders are registered on the public website, and it merely serves as a 
template for what “could be” in terms of a registry.39  
On May 17, 2011, Rockland County, New York, became the second 
county in the nation to adopt an animal abuse registry.40  The county found it 
was in the best interest of its citizens to adopt a local law modeled after 
Suffolk County’s registry because of the serious problems associated with 
animal abuse.41  The Rockland County Sherriff’s department is empowered 
to establish and maintain an Animal Abuser Registry.42  The requirements 
are modeled off of the Suffolk County Animal Abuse Registry.43  Offenders 
must remain on the registry for four years and, if subsequently convicted of 
another animal abuse crime, are required to remain for an additional four 
years.44  Offenders must pay an annual fee of $50.45  The law also makes it 
illegal for a person, shelter, or humane society, to knowingly or unknowingly 
sell or offer to sell an animal to an offender on the registry.46  
That same year, on October 11, 2011, Albany County, New York, 
became the third county in the nation to pass legislation creating an animal 
abuse registry, called the “Animal Abuse Registry Law.”47  The online 
registry requires the name, address, and a photo of any Albany County 
resident who is of the age sixteen or older and has been convicted of an 
“Animal Abuse Crime.”48  The county police department contracted with the 
Mohawk & Hudson River Humane Society (MHRHS) to establish and 
maintain the registry.49 Offenders are placed on the registry for ten years.50 
                                                                                                                           
39. SUFFOLK COUNTY S.P.C.A., https://suffolkspca.org/Abuser%20Registry.html (last visited Mar. 9, 
2015). 
40. ROCKLAND COUNTY, N.Y., CODE ch. 230, art. II (2011), available at 
http://www.ecode360.com/15306524; Stephan Otto, Rockland County, New York Unanimously 
Approves Animal Abuser Registry!, ALDF (May 18, 2011), http://aldf.org/blog/rockland-county-
new-york-unanimously-approves-animal-abuser-registry/ (discussing the passage of Rockland 
County’s animal abuse registry).  
41. ROCKLAND COUNTY, CODE § 230-5. 
42. Id. § 230-7. 
43. Id. § 230-8 (requiring all residents who are eighteen years of age or older and who are convicted of 
an animal abuse crime to submit his or her name, aliases, address, and photo). 
44. Id. § 230-8(F). 
45. Id. § 230-9. 
46. Id. § 230-11. 
47. ALBANY COUNTY, N.Y., LOCAL LAW K (2011), available at 
http://access.albanycounty.com/legislature/resolutions/2011/20111011/LocalLawK.pdf; Ian Carr, 
Albany County, NY Passes Nation’s Third Animal Abuser Registry Law, ALDF (Oct. 12, 2011), 
http://aldf.org/blog/albany-county-ny-passes-nations-third-animal-abuser-registry-law/ (discussing 
the new county legislation). 
48. Id. § 5. 
49. Id. § 4; Animal Abuser Registry, MOHAWK HUDSON HUMANE SOC’Y, 
http://www.mohawkhumane.org/registry.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (explaining the Albany 
County Animal Abuser Registry and providing the offenders, which currently only includes one 
person).  
50. Id. § 4. 
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This law makes it a crime for any person or shelter to give, sell, or adopt an 
animal to an offender on the registry, which is punishable by fine of $5000.51 
 New York City followed the lead of neighboring counties by adopting 
an animal abuse registry on February 4, 2014.52  The New York City Council 
voted unanimously to override former Mayor Bloomberg’s veto to create the 
animal abuser registry across the five boroughs.53  The registry is only 
accessible by certain, specified groups.54  The law empowers the New York 
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to create and maintain the 
registry, which shall contain the names and addresses of residents who have 
been convicted of an animal abuse crime.55  Each offender must be registered 
for five years or, if subsequently convicted of another animal abuse crime, 
must remain registered for ten years following his or her most recent 
conviction.56 
D.  All Proposed State Animal Abuse Registries Have Failed  
In response to a perceived statewide need, several states have 
introduced legislation creating a statewide public animal abuse registry, but 
all have failed to pass.57  These states include: Alaska, California, Colorado, 
Rhode Island, and Tennessee.58  
Alaska introduced the first bill proposing a state animal abuser registry 
in 1996.59  The proposed legislation required an animal abuser residing in the 
state to provide, at a minimum, his or her name, aliases, address, place of 
employment, date of birth, animal abuse convictions, dates and places of 
animal abuse convictions, and driver’s license number.60  The duty to register 
would be relieved ten years after discharge from a conviction of animal 
abuse.61  Under the proposed legislation, this information would not have 
                                                                                                                           
51. Id. § 7.  
52. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, ch. 15 (2014), available at 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1194780&GUID=4283D6A7-F421-
44D9-AFCD-0053D523B89A&Options=ID%7CText&FullText=1. 
53. Chris Green, NYC Creates City-Wide Animal Abuser Registry!, ALDF (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://aldf.org/blog/nyc-creates-city-wide-animal-abuser-registry/. 
54. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 17-1502 (“Such registry shall be in electronic form and 
shall be made available to all law enforcement agencies, district attorneys, duly incorporated 
humane societies, societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, dog or cat protective 
associations, animal control officers, pet shops and animal shelters operating in the city of New 
York.”). 
55. Id. § 17-1502. 
56. Id. § 17-1503. 
57. Nowicki, supra note 6, at 221–28. 
58. Id. (explaining the seven proposed bills and their demise). 
59. S. 238, 19th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ala. 1996). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
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been publicly accessible.62  However, the bill failed to make it past the State’s 
Judiciary Committee.63  
Six years later, Colorado introduced a bill designed to create the “State 
Registry of Animal Cruelty Offenders.”64  The bill required any Colorado 
resident who committed animal cruelty or aggravated cruelty to register with 
the Colorado Bureau of Investigation.65  The Colorado General Assembly 
declared it necessary to enact such a bill to address animal cruelty and its 
many associated problems.66   Some of the associated problems cited include: 
consistent patterns of animal abuse among perpetrators of child abuse, 
spousal abuse, and elder abuse; that many animal abusers are adolescents, 
some as young as four years old; and animal cruelty is a great indicator that 
“a person is developing a detrimental pattern of behavior in which power and 
control is sought by inflicting injury upon others.”67  The Colorado registry 
would have been made available to the public.68  The bill was passed with 
amendments in the Colorado Senate.69  It was then assigned to the House 
State, Veterans, & Military Affairs Committee, where it was postponed 
indefinitely.70 
A year later, in 2003, Rhode Island proposed a bill that included a 
statewide animal abuse registry.71  The bill would have made local law 
enforcement agencies responsible for obtaining offender information and 
maintaining the registry for five years.72  It would have required the offender 
to provide his or her name, aliases, date of birth, Social Security number, 
address, place of employment, date and place of animal abuse offense, a 
photograph, fingerprints, and any tattoos or scars.73  Besides the Social 
Security number, all information would have been available to the public 
through the Internet.74  The bill never passed.75  
In 2008, the Tennessee Senate introduced a bill creating the “Tennessee 
Animal Abuser Registration, Tracking and Verification Act of 2008.”76 Any 
person who committed aggravated cruelty to animals, felony animal fighting, 
or bestiality would have had to comply with the registry.77  Violation of the 
                                                                                                                           
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. S. 02-48, 63d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2002). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. (bill summary). 
70. Id.   
71. H.R. 5817, 2003 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2003). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. S. 2676, 105th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008). 
77. Id. 
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bill would have been a Class E felony only punishable by a fine.78  The bill 
focused on public safety and awareness.  As originally introduced, the bill 
required an exhaustive list of information required for the registry.79  The bill 
was amended to remove many of the requirements, leaving similar 
requirements as Illinois’ proposed bill.80  As amended, the bill required the 
offenders to pay a one-time fee of $50.81  The bill ultimately died in the 
Tennessee House.82   
Two years later, Senator Dean Florez introduced an animal abuse 
registry in the California Senate on February 19, 2010.83  The Bill, drafted 
with the aid of The Animal Legal Defense Fund,84 required “any person, over 
18 years of age, convicted of felony animal abuse, as defined, to register with 
the appropriate law enforcement agency, as provided.”85  The offender would 
have been required to provide similar information as the other registries, but 
it was not as exclusive.86  Certain information would have been available to 
the public through the Internet, which would have been maintained by the 
California Department of Justice.87  The offender would also have been 
required to register for life.88  The Bill moved through the Senate Judiciary 
Committee in April, however, it failed to pass due to extreme cost estimates 
provided by the State Department of Justice.89   
 
                                                                                                                           
78. Id. 
79. Id. (as originally introduced). 
80. Id. (“Under this amendment, the registry would consist of a person's name, date of birth, address, 
all animal abuse convictions, conviction dates and locations, the person's photograph, and any other 
identifying data that the TBI deems necessary.”). 
81. Id. (originally the bill required a first-time fee of $275, plus an annual fee of up to $100). 
82. Id. 
83. S. 1277, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010). 
84. Jesse McKinley, Lawmakers Consider an Animal Abuse Registry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/22/us/22abuse.html?th&emc=th&_r=0. See also Cal. S. 1277 
(Apr. 19, 2010 bill analysis). 
85. Cal. S. 1277 (legislative digest).  
86. Id. (requiring the person to give his or her legal name, aliases, current address, name and address of 
employer, conviction information, and “any other information as may be required by the 
Department of Justice.”).  
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Animal Abuser Registry Proposed in California: 6/14/10 Update, ALDF (June 14, 2010), 
http://aldf.org/press-room/animal-abuser-registry-proposed-in-california/ (“While other states 
considering abuser registry legislation have compiled fiscal estimates ranging from $19,000 to 
$60,000 for costs of implementation of such registries, California’s DOJ, in stark contrast, 
submitted estimates to the Senate Appropriations Committee ranging from $750,000 to $2 million. 
Owing to legislative deadline constraints, ALDF and the bill’s sponsor were unable to successfully 
challenge these figures.”).  
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E.  Illinois Registries  
Illinois has recognized the societal need to protect children and the 
public by enacting two other abuse-related registries.90  The Habitual Child 
Sex Offender Registration Act, later amended as the Sex Offender 
Registration Act (the SORA), was the first statewide registry adopted in 
Illinois.91  SORA, in tandem with the Sex Offender Community Notification 
Law (Notification Law) provides an extensive scheme for the registration of 
sex offenders in Illinois and the dissemination of information to the public 
regarding the offenders.92  Not surprising, the purpose of enacting the SORA 
and the Notification Law was “to create an additional measure of protection 
for children from the increasing incidence of sexual assault and child 
abuse.”93  The Illinois Supreme Court has long held registering under the 
SORA does not constitute punishment because the purpose is not to punish 
offenders, but rather enhance public safety.94  The First District Court of 
Appeals for Illinois upheld the SORA and the Notification Laws against 
challenges based on due process, right to privacy, and equal protection.95  It 
held, echoing the Illinois Supreme Court, that two statutes did not violate an 
offender’s right to privacy under the Illinois Constitution because an 
offender’s crimes and addresses are already public information.96  The court 
                                                                                                                           
90. See Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1-12 (2014); Murderer and Violent 
Offender Against Youth Registration Act, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 154/1-105 (2014). However, 
Illinois has enacted other offender registries, which include the Methamphetamine Manufacturer 
Registry Act, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-10 (2014), and the Arsonist Registration Act, 730 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 148/1-10 (2014).  
91. Habitual Sex Offender Registration Act, Pub. Act. No. 84-1279, 1986 Ill. Laws 1467 (codified as 
amended at 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/1-150/12) (requiring any person who has been charged of 
any of the listed offenses in 150/2(B),(C) to register, when the charge results in “a conviction for 
the commission of the offense or attempt to commit the offense, a finding of not guilty by reason 
of insanity of committing the offense or attempting to commit the offense, or a finding not resulting 
in an acquittal at a hearing for the alleged commission or attempted commission of the offense.” 
The offender must remain on the registry for ten years).  
92. People v. Beard, 851 N.E.2d 141, 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (citing People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 
433, 437 (Ill. 2000)); see 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152 (2013) (requiring the Illinois State Police to 
establish and maintain a statewide Sex Offender Database for persons who have been convicted of 
certain sex offenses and/or crimes against children); Illinois Sex Offender Information, Disclaimer, 
ILL. ST. POLICE, https://www.isp.state.il.us/sor/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (explaining what the 
registry is, how it works, and important reminders, while also providing access to the Sex Offender 
Database).  
93. Id. (citing Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 437); see Lesher v. Trent, 944 N.E.2d 479, 483 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2011) (“The purpose of the Sex Offender Registration Act is to enhance public safety by enabling 
law enforcement agencies to keep track of sex offenders.”). 
94. People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. 1991); Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 438; Lesher, 944 N.E.2d 
at 484.  
95. Beard, 851 N.E.2d at 150. 
96. Id. at 148; People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 300 (Ill. 2004) (holding that the criminal lowered 
the reasonable expectation of privacy by committing a crime that resulted in his prosecution and a 
public record).  
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also held that the SORA and the Notification Law do not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause because they are rationally related to “furthering legitimate 
state interest of protecting children from sex offenders.”97  Lastly, this court 
and the Illinois Supreme Court have both held the SORA and the Notification 
Law do not violate an offender’s due process right.98  
The second registry currently in force in Illinois is the Child Murderer 
and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act, which is a registry for 
all violent offenders against children.99  The information is not open to the 
public and only a limited group of persons can see the registry.100  The 
offender must remain on the registry for at least ten years after convicted or 
for their natural life if previously subjected to registration under this Act or 
the SORA.101  Illinois courts have not yet addressed the constitutional 
limitations of this registry.  
F.  Illinois’ Proposed Animal Abuse Registry HR 4188 
On January 8, 2014, Illinois State Representative Maria Antonia (Toni) 
Berrios, D-Chicago, introduced a bill, HR 4188, creating an Animal Abuse 
Registry.102  It proposes to amend the State Finance Act creating the Animal 
Abuse Registry Fund, as well as amending the Humane Care for Animals Act 
by detailing how the Registry will work.103  The bill provides that the 
Department of Agriculture “shall create and maintain the animal abuse 
registry.”104  It further states, “Any person 18 years of age or older that resides 
in or is domiciled in this State that has been convicted of a violation of 
Sections 3.01, 3.02, or 3.03 of this Act shall register with the Department 
within thirty calendar days after the date of conviction to be placed on the 
animal abuse registry.”105  Currently, an offender convicted of Section 3.01 
                                                                                                                           
97. Id. at 206. 
98. Id. at 1486–48; In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 757 (Ill. 2004) (holding that the Registration Act and 
Notification Law do not infringe on fundamental rights and are subject to the rational basis test).  
99. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 154/1-105 (2014).  
100. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 154/55 (“Except as provided in the Murderer and Violent Offender Against 
Youth Community Notification Law, the statements or any other information required by this Act 
shall not be open to inspection by the public, or by any person other than by a law enforcement 
officer or other individual as may be authorized by law and shall include law enforcement agencies 
of this State, any other state, or of the federal government.”); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 154/95 
(requiring the disclosure of certain information to boards of institutions, school boards or principals 
of non-public schools, child care facilities, and libraries in areas where the offender is required to 
register or is employed).  
101. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 154/40. 
102. H.R. 4188, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014).  See also T.J. Fowler, Animal Abuse Registry 
Proposed, THE S. ILLINOISAN (Jan. 22, 2014), http://thesouthern.com/news/animal-abuse-registry-
proposed/article_3814cb50-832a-11e3-b8d9-0019bb2963f4.html (discussing the proposed bill).  
103. Ill. H.R. 4188. 
104. Id.  
105. Id. 
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is guilty of animal cruelty,106 convicted of Section 3.02 is guilty of aggravated 
animal cruelty,107 or convicted of Section 3.03 is guilty of animal torture 
(hereafter called the Offenses).108  Offenders must provide the Department 
with their name, date of birth, address, and offense for which he or she has 
been convicted.109  The offender must register annually and pay an annual 
fee of $50 to the Department, which would be used to fund the registry.110  
Distinct from other Illinois registries, once a person is convicted of one 
of the three violations, the offender is indefinitely listed on the registry unless 
that person first “demonstrates to the court that he or she has undergone 
psychiatric or psychological testing, the result of which indicates by clear 
and convincing evidence his or her capable and sound mental capacity and 
ability to own and properly care for an animal in a humane manner.”111  Any 
person on the registry is not allowed to own a companion animal or be 
employed at an “animal shelter, pound, pet shop, zoo, or other business 
establishment where companion animals are present.”112  Similar to the 
SORA, the registry would also be publicly accessible and include the offense 
for which the offender has been convicted.113  Failure to register would be a 
                                                                                                                           
106. Humane Care for Animals Act, 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.01 (2013) (“Cruel treatment.  No person 
or owner may beat, cruelly treat, torment, starve, overwork or otherwise abuse any animal.  No 
owner may abandon any animal where it may become a public charge or may suffer injury, hunger 
or exposure.  A person convicted of violating this Section is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.  A 
second or subsequent conviction for a violation of this Section is a Class 4 felony.”). 
107. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.02 (“Aggravated animal cruelty. (a) No person may intentionally 
commit an act that causes a companion animal to suffer serious injury or death.  Aggravated cruelty 
does not include euthanasia of a companion animal through recognized methods approved by the 
Department of Agriculture unless prohibited under subsection (b). (b) No individual, except a 
licensed veterinarian as exempted under Section 3.09, may knowingly or intentionally euthanize or 
authorize the euthanasia of a companion animal by use of carbon monoxide.  (c) A person convicted 
of violating Section 3.02 is guilty of a Class 4 felony.  A second or subsequent violation is a Class 
3 felony.”). 
108. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.03 (“Animal torture. (a) A person commits animal torture when that 
person without legal justification knowingly or intentionally tortures an animal.  For purposes of 
this Section, and subject to subsection (b), “torture” means infliction of or subjection to extreme 
physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering, or agony of the 
animal. (b) For the purposes of this Section, “animal torture” does not include any death, harm, or 
injury caused to any animal by any of the following activities:  (1) any hunting, fishing, trapping, 
or other activity allowed under the Wildlife Code, the Wildlife Habitat Management Areas Act, or 
the Fish and Aquatic Life Code; (2) any alteration or destruction of any animal done by any person 
or unit of government pursuant to statute, ordinance, court order, or the direction of a licensed 
veterinarian; (3) any alteration or destruction of any animal by any person for any legitimate 
purpose, including, but not limited to: castration, culling, declawing, defanging, ear cropping, 
euthanasia, gelding, grooming, neutering, polling, shearing, shoeing, slaughtering, spaying, tail 
docking, and vivisection; and (4) any other activity that may be lawfully done to an animal. (c) A 
person convicted of violating this Section is guilty of a Class 3 felony.”). 
109. H.R. 4188, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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Class B misdemeanor for the first offense, and subsequent violations would 
be considered Class 4 felonies.114 
Speaking in regard to the legislative intent, Berrios said the Bill would 
reduce repeat offenses “by addressing the weakness of current animal cruelty 
penalties.”115  Berrios further stated she introduced the Bill for tougher 
penalties aimed at animal abusers, considering one of the animal abuse 
crimes is only a Class A misdemeanor.116 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
When a state requires certain criminals to register their personal 
information to a public registry, it faces constitutional limitations.117  If 
Illinois’ proposed animal abuse registry passes, it will most likely face 
constitutional challenges based on infringement of procedural due process 
rights, substantive due process, and personal privacy rights.  As mentioned 
above, Illinois courts have upheld the Sex Offender Registration Act, which 
serves as a public deterrence and promotes public safety.118  
When a statute’s constitutionality is challenged, Illinois courts 
traditionally consider the legislative intent and the statutory construction of 
the statute.119  It is well established that statutes are presumed constitutional, 
and the challenging party must prove the statute is invalid.120  Illinois courts 
have a duty to construe the statute in a reasonable way that upholds its 
constitutionality.121  Although the Illinois’ Animal Abuse Registry has not 
been enacted, these principles will govern how an Illinois court would 
analyze the constitutional limitations if the registry passes.  
A.  Due Process Challenge  
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, “No State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”122  The 
                                                                                                                           
114. Id. 
115. Fowler, supra note 102. 
116. Id. 
117. See, e.g., George L. Blum, Annotation, Constitutional Challenges to State Child Abuse Registries, 
36 A.L.R. 6TH 475 (2008) (discussing the cases that have reviewed constitutional challenges to state 
child abuse registries); People v. Beard, 851 N.E.2d 141, 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (where defendant 
alleged the SORA and the Notification Law of Illinois violated due process, right of privacy, and 
equal protection because his crime was not sexually motivated); People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 
433 (Ill. 2000). 
118. See supra notes 90–94.  
119. See, e.g., Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433 (applying the rules of statutory interpretation to the SORA); 
People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ill. 1991) (assessing the constitutionality of the SORA and 
the legislative history). 
120. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 437. 
121. Id.  
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Amendment has been interpreted to protect both procedural due process and 
substantive due process rights.123  Procedural due process requires a person 
in danger of a serious deprivation of life, liberty, or property due to 
government action to be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.124  
Substantive due process requires the government to have a reasonable 
justification, which serves a legitimate governmental interest, before taking 
a person’s life, liberty, or property.125  An offender who is placed on an 
animal abuse registry would likely challenge the statute alleging it violates 
both their procedural due process and substantive due process rights.  
1.  Procedural Due Process Challenge  
Under a procedural due process claim, the court must first determine 
whether the government is infringing upon a protected life, liberty, or 
property interest.126  The Supreme Court has held that a right to reputation 
does not exist absent a showing of the loss of a previously held legal right.127 
The “stigma-plus” test was extended in terms of loss of government 
employment in Siegert v. Gilley.128  The Court held that a “plaintiff would 
need to show the loss of employment was contemporaneous and coincided 
with the harm to the terminated employee’s reputation; that is, the stigmatic 
injury must arise as the employee is being terminated.”129  
Once the court determines the government is infringing on a protected 
life, liberty, or property interest, the court must determine how much process 
is due.  The Supreme Court has developed a three-factor balancing test to 
determine how much process is due.130  The three factors are: (1) “the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an 
                                                                                                                           
123. Jill Wieber Lens, Procedural Due Process and Predictable Punitive Damage Awards, 2012 BYU 
L. REV. 1, 10 (discussing the difference between procedural and substantive due process and the 
significance it has on punitive damages). 
124. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 523 (2d ed. 2002); 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976); People v. Beard, 851 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2006). 
125. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 124, at 524; Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Beard, 851 
N.E.2d at 145. 
126. Beard, 851 N.E.2d at 145 (citing People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 304 (Ill. 2004)).  
127. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708–09 (1976) (where a Kentucky police department placed plaintiff’s 
name on a list of active shoplifters and circulated to local merchants.  Plaintiff claimed circulation 
of his name had injured his reputation, but the Court held he had no protected interest in his 
reputation alone, “apart from some more tangible interests”); Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due 
Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 91 (2009). 
128. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).  
129. Mitnick, supra note 127, at 100 (citing Siegert, 500 U.S. at 234). 
130. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).  The Court held that interest of an individual 
in continued receipt of social security benefits is a statutorily created “property” interest protected 
by the Fifth Amendment.  Id.  The Court balanced three factors to determine an evidentiary hearing 
was not required prior to the termination of disability benefits, and the then-present administrative 
procedures fully comported with procedural due process right.  Id. 
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erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and 
(3) “the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.”131 
Revisiting the introductory scenario, Jill could challenge the registry 
based on a procedural due process claim if the registry is passed.  She could 
argue the registry causes harm to her reputation plus a tangible interest in 
liberty, as required by Paul v. Davis.132  Under the “stigma-plus” test, a state’s 
listing of an individual’s name, birth date, and address on an employer-
accessible abuse registry constitutes a stigma attached to the accused.  This 
is arguably more defaming than posting notice of active shoplifters133 or 
posting a notice that an individual may not be sold alcoholic beverages.134  In 
the latter case, the Supreme Court ruled that the notice infringed upon the 
plaintiff’s protected liberty interest due to his reputation plus the loss of his 
right to buy alcohol.135  That case is similar to the case of an animal offender 
being placed on a public registry, which employers will see, because his or 
her reputation is tainted and it damages his or her opportunity for 
employment.  The proposed registry prevents offenders from working at 
shelters, pounds, pet shops, zoos, or other business where animals are 
present.136  The latter category already places an unreasonable barrier for 
employment, but coupled with the damaging employer-accessible registry, it 
is hard to deny that registrants would be faced with a loss of reputation plus 
a loss of employment opportunities.  
An animal abuser has similar living restrictions as sex offenders who 
cannot live within “500 feet of a school, playground, or any facility providing 
programs or services exclusively directed toward people under age 18.”137 
Such limitations on one’s liberty must be equated to the severity of the 
offense.  Overall, there is a general understanding across all jurisdictions that 
community notification negatively affects reputation.138  This, coupled with 
                                                                                                                           
131. Id. 
132. 424 U.S. at 708–09. 
133. See id. at 694. 
134. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 435-36 (1971). 
135. Id. at 437. 
136. H.R. 4188, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014). 
137. Frequently Asked Questions, ILL. SEX OFFENDER INFO., 
http://www.isp.state.il.us/sor/faq.cfm?CFID=105490341&CFTOKEN=43125f2a41e68840-
0A67BB8F-A3AB-8467-
21C6171012057B6B&jsessionid=ec307aad4881a94027084fd6134017623433#unsupervised (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
138. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law: Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural 
Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 
1172 n.25 (1999).  
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the extensive and onerous registration obligations on registrants, could 
satisfy the “stigma-plus” test.139  
The Supreme Court has held the loss of employment must be concurrent 
with the stigmatizing result, however, this was decided in terms of public 
employment.140  It is not implausible for a registrant to be stigmatically 
injured while being terminated.  Therefore, an argument based on 
reputational injury and loss of employment could be recognized as a 
protected interest by an Illinois court.  A protected interest could also be 
found based on the negative reputation plus the extensive registration 
requirements.   
Once the Illinois court recognizes that Jill has a protected liberty 
interest, which the government is infringing upon through the registry, they 
will determine how much process is due using the three-factor analysis. 
Regarding the first factor, requiring Jill to register would harm her reputation 
and her interest in employment.  An individual on any registry is branded by 
the state as a person to be feared and avoided.  Animal abusers suffer harm 
to their reputations by way of public information of their offense and possible 
jail time.  Justice Brennan noticed in the dissent of Paul v. Davis that state 
condemnation of “individuals as criminals . . .  thereby brand[s] them with 
one of the most stigmatizing and debilitating labels in our society.”141  An 
individual’s reputation cannot be replaced by some other credibility, as one 
might be able to receive other government benefits other than social 
security.142  
As to the second factor, requiring all offenders convicted of animal 
cruelty, aggravated animal cruelty, or animal torture to register for the 
proposed registry involves a risk of erroneous deprivation because wrongful 
conviction is possible.  An experiment testing the “the innocent defendant’s 
dilemma” showed both guilty and innocent students accepted an offered plea 
bargain and confessed to the alleged conduct.143  Specifically, “[A]lmost  
                                                                                                                           
139. Lower courts are split regarding sex offender registrations, with most concluding the additional 
burden of registering satisfies the second part of the test.  See, e.g., Mitnick, supra note 127, at 135 
(discussing the due process limitations on sex offender community notification laws); See also 
Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 
86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 364–65 (2006) (citing a collection of cases). 
140. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 229 (1991) (where the plaintiff’s employment had been terminated 
and he had been rendered ineligible for future government employment). 
141. 424 U.S. 693, 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Mitnick, supra note 127, at 110 (discussing how 
“reputation might most usefully be conceptualized as constitutive of social identity and individual 
self-concepts.”). 
142. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
143. Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative 
Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 33 
(2013) (“In this article, Professors Dervan and Edkins discuss a recent psychological study they 
completed regarding plea bargaining and innocence.  The study, involving dozens of college 
students and taking place over several months, revealed that more than half of the innocent 
participants were willing to falsely admit guilt in return for a benefit.”). 
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nine out of ten guilty study participants accepted the deal, while slightly 
fewer than six out of ten innocent study participants took the same path.”144 
This recent study shows the tendency for innocent individuals to take a plea 
bargain in return for a reduced punishment.145  Additionally, convicted 
animal abusers either pay their fine or serve their time in prison for their 
wrongdoing, which is payment for their crime.  The current procedures are 
sufficient to deter animal abusers from abusing animals or humans.  
As to the third factor, the intent of the proposed legislation is to protect 
animals, reduce repeat offenders, and allow employers “to see if people they 
were thinking of hiring would ensure that animals were safe.”146  These 
interests should be inferior to an offender’s interest in her reputation and 
employment because of the social and personal significance of reputation, as 
mentioned above, and the vitality of employment.  However, requiring the 
state to provide additional procedures may come with high fiscal and 
administrative burdens.  
As of now, the proposed bill only requires the offender to provide the 
Department of Agriculture with certain information.147 The burden of 
requiring a pre-deprivation hearing would result in the Department spending 
time and money for every individual case.  As the Supreme Court held in 
Matthews v. Eldridge, it is not plausible a court would find a pre-deprivation 
hearing reasonable.148  Although a court may find Jill has a protected interest 
in her reputation plus future employment, an Illinois court may find that the 
proposed amendment may provide sufficient due process.  However, Illinois 
courts should recognize the significance of an offender’s protected interest 
and compel the State to provide further process, such as a registration hearing 
to determine if registering is necessary. 
2.  Substantive Due Process 
Under a substantive due process claim, the court “asks whether the 
government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty or 
property,” and “looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the 
government’s action.”149  Courts first look to whether the government is 
infringing upon a fundamental right of all people.150  If the court finds the 
action allegedly infringes upon a fundamental right, the court will apply strict 
scrutiny.151  The government must then show the infringement is necessary 
                                                                                                                           
144. Id. at 33. 
145. Id. at 35–36. 
146. Fowler, supra note 102 (discussing the genesis of the bill).  
147. H.R. 4188, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014). 
148. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
149. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 124, at 11. 
150. People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 304 (Ill. 2004). 
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to serve a compelling government interest, and the statute must be “narrowly 
tailored” or the “least restrictive means” to achieve such interests.152 
However, if the court determines the action does not involve a fundamental 
right, the court will apply the rational basis test.153  The government action is 
presumed constitutional, and the challenger must prove the action is not 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.154  The Supreme Court 
has interpreted the U.S. Constitution to include a right of privacy that applies 
to “personal decisions involving ‘marriage, procreation, contraception, 
family relationships, and child rearing and education.’”155 
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the information offenders are 
required to register under the SORA and the Notification Law is not subject 
to the federal right to privacy because the information is not within any of 
the recognized privacy rights.156  Seeing as the Supreme Court has only 
recognized a limited amount of privacy rights, it is unlikely Illinois courts 
would find an animal abuser’s information is protected by the federal right 
to privacy.   
B.  Illinois’ Express “Personal Privacy” 
A registrant may allege that the proposed animal abuse registry 
impermissibly infringes upon his or her constitutional right to privacy under 
the Illinois Constitution.  Such may be alleged under the implied right 
provided in the U.S. Constitution, as mentioned above, and the explicit 
privacy right under the Illinois Constitution.157  
Although a registrant is unlikely to survive an attack on their federal 
right to privacy, the Illinois Constitution explicitly provides for a right of 
privacy, which extends “‘beyond federal constitutional guarantees by 
expressly recognizing a zone of personal privacy’ and this provision is stated 
‘broadly and without restrictions.’”158  The court must first determine 
“whether the defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy” in his 
                                                                                                                           
152. Id.  
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–
53 (1973)).  See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma 
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942) (procreation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
453–54 (1972) (contraception); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family 
relationships); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (child rearing); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (education). 
156. People v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433, 441 (Ill. 2000); People v. Beard, 851 N.E.2d 141, 148 (Ill. 
2006). 
157. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at 441. 
158. Id. (quoting Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1055 (Ill. 1997)); Beard, 851 N.E.2d at 148.  
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information, in this case the animal abuser’s personal information.159  Then 
the court will consider whether mandating public access to the personal 
information “unreasonably invades that privacy expectation.”160  The SORA 
and the Notification Law have been upheld against such an attack with the 
Supreme Court of Illinois, holding that an individual “does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his sex offender information because 
that information is already public as part of the court record and the 
dissemination of that information is the result of the defendant’s own 
criminal conduct.”161  However, the court noted the purpose of that registry 
is to protect children and allow law enforcement to monitor sex offenders, 
and the Notification Law is intended to protect the public; therefore, the 
information was never private.162  
In Jill’s case and any other potential registrants’, her expectation of 
privacy should be analyzed differently than a sex offender’s expectation.  It 
seems the purpose of the registry would be for establishments looking to sell 
animals or hire individuals to work with animals to view the list, whereas the 
purpose of the sex offender registry is for law enforcement to monitor sex 
offenders, which protect children and the public.  The two purposes are quite 
different.  One is to protect animals, which cannot view the registry 
themselves, and the other is to protect society, as they may be harmed. It can 
be said an animal abusers’ court record is public information, but Jill and 
other offenders have a reasonable expectation that the information will not 
be viewed by an employer, absent a reason to inquire into a background 
search.  Further, Jill has a reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to her 
personal information, including where she lives.  A court should recognize a 
qualifying registrant has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
A public registration of personal and court information would 
unreasonably invade Jill’s and other similarly situated individuals’ 
expectation of privacy.  Unlike the SORA, other less invasive means are 
available to prevent an animal abuser from buying animals.  It is also 
unreasonable to require convicted animal abusers not to be employed at an 
establishment where companion animals are present.  The all-encompassing 
“other business establishment where companion animals are present” allows 
any employer to refuse employment and use this information in employment 
decisions.  A public registration that does not further public safety should 
constitute an unreasonable invasion of a registrant’s expectation of privacy. 
                                                                                                                           
159. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d at 298 (explaining Illinois’ guarantee of personal privacy in terms of the 
SORA and the Notification Law). 
160. Id.  
161. Beard, 851 N.E.2d at 148 (citing Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d at 300). 
162. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d at 297–98 (discussing how the Illinois Supreme Court held that the pre-
amendment Notification Law, which allowed public inspection upon request, was constitutional, 
and the amendment to the Notification Law creating Internet access does not infringe on a 
defendant’s personal privacy rights).  
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF STATEWIDE ANIMAL ABUSE REGISTRY 
A.  Impracticality of the Registry  
A statewide animal abuse registry is not practical in Illinois and should 
not be adopted.  Illinois is in no place financially to establish the first 
statewide registry.  Further, the flaws in the bill will suppress any benefits 
the proposed bill may have.  
In recent years, legislatures and advocates have often cited the link 
between cruelty to animals and the potential for violence to people as their 
motivation for new animal protection laws.163  The research cited shows that 
serial sex offenders have a history of animal abuse before they graduate to 
human victims.164  Two problems arise when relying on this data.  First, if 
one speculates as to when this behavior begins, it would presumptively be 
during an offender’s childhood.  The State loses its argument as to the 
offender’s information on the registry being public information because 
juvenile court records are sealed and minors would not be required to register. 
Second, the State is chastising an animal abuser for the potential to commit 
a future crime.  Although research supports this link, the State cannot charge 
a man with a crime before he has done it, especially when the crime involves 
such a severe “graduation” from animal to humans.  
Further, the rights of an animal cannot be placed over the rights of a 
human. It is true that animals need a voice because they cannot speak for 
themselves, that they feel pain, and animal abuse is wrong, but an animal 
abuse registry is not the most effective means to protect animals.  Humans 
run the world.  They work to ensure the population is fed, clothed, and 
housed.  They are provided with individual or group rights, as recognized by 
the U.S. and state constitutions.  After World War II, the United Nations 
established certain basic human rights by adopting the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.165 Both international human rights and federally 
                                                                                                                           
163. See, e.g., Animal Cruelty, ASPCA, supra note 2, at 17 (assessing that there is widespread 
recognition of this link, and in recent years there are been “a noticeable increase in interests in 
animal cruelty cases”). 
164. Animal Cruelty, HUMANE SOC’Y, supra note 14. 
165. International Human Rights Law, OF. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS., 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 
2015).  The website discusses how international human rights law developed and the authority 
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recognized rights show the importance of being an individual person.  There 
comes a point where the rights of animals must give way to a human’s rights.  
The proposed bill should not be passed as written because the current 
language is impractical.  Such implications include that the registration 
would be too expensive for the State to implement, too expensive for a 
registrant, and is harsher than Illinois’ sex offender registry. 
The proposed bill should not be passed because of the financial burden 
associated with it and the current financial state of Illinois.  As of June 30, 
2012, Illinois has $47.2 billion in bond debt service, including $30.3 billion 
in principal and $16.9 billion in interest.166  If this is any indication of the 
senseless volume of money the State is spending, an animal abuse registry 
should be a low priority of the Illinois legislature.  Although the language of 
the proposed bill states the $50 registration fee will “be used by the 
Department for establishing and maintaining the animal abuse registry,”167 
an initial cost of starting the registry will have to be paid by the State.  The 
cost of creating the registry can range from $19,000 to $60,000 and 
potentially $750,000 to $2 million, as estimated by the California Department 
of Justice.168 
The proposed bill would also implicate poverty barriers.  Any person 
who is in a similar situation as Jill would not be able to afford the required 
$50 annual registration fee.  Illinois would need this registration fee to 
support the registration, but it should not be to the detriment of the offenders. 
An annual fee of $50 may not seem substantial, but the cost would burden an 
already impoverished criminal.  As the proposal is written, an offender is 
required to pay for the rest of his or her life, unless the offender proves he or 
she has been rehabilitated.  That means on top of the annual fee, Jill would 
have to pay for psychiatric or psychological testing.  The statute does not 
provide what kind, type, or the amount of treatment is required to deem Jill 
rehabilitated.  It is difficult to think she, or most criminals, could afford the 
mandated treatment.  The cost of treatment is not the end solution.  Jill must 
go to court to prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that the psychiatric 
or psychological treatment resulted in her “capable and sound mental 
capacity and ability to own and properly care for an animal in a humane 
manner.”169  The abovementioned costs associated with the registry will 
result in poverty, lifetime registration, and an inability to maintain 
registration. 
Lastly, as the proposed bill is written, registration would be harsher than 
the Illinois sex offender registration, which requires registration for more 
                                                                                                                           
166. Debt Levels, ST. OF ILL. COMPTROLLER, http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/fiscal-condition/debt-
levels/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (explaining the debt levels in Illinois as of 2012).  
167. H.R. 4188, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014).  
168. California Registry, supra note 89. 
169. Ill. H.R. 4188. 
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heinous crimes.  Registrants would be prohibited from working “at an animal 
shelter, pound, pet shop, zoo, or other business establishment where 
companion animals are present.”170  Such a restriction will likely prevent 
registrants from working most places because numerous stores allow 
customers to bring their pets into the store.  On the other hand, Illinois sex 
offenders are only prohibited from working with children or youth-related 
programs.171  
Although Illinois’ proposed animal abuse registry is trying to limit the 
offender’s interaction with potential victims, like the sex offender 
limitations, the last employment limitation is too broad.  A similar catch-all 
phrase does not limit sex offenders because it would be impossible to limit 
their employment from anywhere children are present, as a slightly similar 
complication faces animal offenders and animals.  Furthermore, registrants 
would be required to register until they are deemed capable to care for an 
animal after psychological treatment.172  Sex offenders are only required to 
register for ten years, unless an individual has been found to be a sexually 
violent person or becomes subject to registration again.173  The higher burden 
the proposed registry would place on registered individuals is far more than 
necessary. 
B.  Ineffectiveness of the Registry   
A statewide animal abuse registry most likely would be ineffective 
because it will not reach its intended goals and current registries are 
ineffective.  Current sex offender and abuser registries provide examples of 
ineffective registries.  Legislators often cite the goal to decrease recidivism 
as a reason for implementing a sex offender registry.  However, statewide 
studies comparing registered and unregistered sex offenders show the rates 
of recidivism between the two groups are not statistically significant.174 
Illinois claims the same objective, and it will only result in the same 
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ineffectiveness.  Animal abuse registries take it one step further, expecting to 
prevent animal abusers from harming humans.  If sex offender registries do 
not reduce repeat sex offenses against children, animal abuse registries 
certainly will not decrease potential abuses against humans by offenders who 
have never before harmed a human.  
It is also unlikely that the proposed registry will efficiently work.  As 
mentioned above, the first animal abuse registry was enacted in 2010, on a 
county basis, and the registry is supposed to be publicly accessible on the 
Internet.175  After four years, this small-scale registry has yet to provide a 
single piece of offender information.176  In fact, none of the county 
registrations are currently operable.177  Compared to a county-based registry, 
the probability of a statewide registry succeeding is poor.  Creating the 
registry will take an immense amount of time and money, seeing as how this 
will be the first statewide registry.  Although the State may be able to compile 
a registry administered by the Department of Agriculture, it is questionable 
as to who will be able to access the information.  This also defeats the purpose 
of making a registry public.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Illinois’ proposed public animal abuse registry should not be passed by 
the Illinois General Assembly because of the myriad of problems presented, 
and, if passed, will likely cause controversy in Illinois courts.  It clearly 
compromises an individual’s constitutional rights because it pushes the 
boundaries of due process and personal privacy.  It would also be impractical 
because of Illinois’ current financial crisis and the harsh ramifications it 
would impose upon taxpayers, administrators, and offenders.  Lastly, the 
registry would be ineffective at attaining the proposed goals of protecting the 
public and animals from future abuse and enforcing a statewide registry. 
Prohibiting animal abusers from owning subsequent animals can be 
accomplished with other less intrusive means, including: animal shelters 
conducting background checks on individuals wanting to buy or adopt and 
creating a private registration that only shelters can obtain.  If this bill is 
passed, individuals like Jill could likely be forced into a position where they 
could lose their children, their homes, or driven to commit other crimes.  
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